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ABSTRACT 
 
Using tract-level data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, we estimate how 
the income tax-related benefits to owner-occupiers are distributed spatially across the 
United States.  Even though the top marginal tax rate has fallen substantially since 1979 
and the tax code more generally has become less progressive, the tax subsidy per 
household or owner was virtually unchanged between 1979-1989, and then rose 
substantially between 1989-1999.  
Geographically, gross program benefits have been and remain very spatially 
targeted.  At the state level, California’s owners have received a disproportionate share of 
the subsidy flows over the past two decades.  Their share of the gross benefits nationally 
has fluctuated from 19 to 22 percent.  Depending upon the year, this is from 1.8 to 2.3 
times their share of the nation’s owners.  For the median state, the ratio of its share of tax 
benefits to its share of owners has declined over time, from 0.83 in 1979 to 0.76 in 1999. 
Examining the data at the metropolitan area level finds an even more dramatic 
spatial targeting, and a spatial skewness that is increasing over time.  Comparing benefit 
flows in 1979 in the top 20 areas versus those in the bottom 20 areas finds that owners in 
the highest subsidy areas received from 2.7 to 8.0 times the subsidy reaped by owners in 
the bottom group.  By 1999, the analogous calculation finds owners in the top 20 areas 
receiving from 3.4 to 17.1 times more benefits than owners in any of the 20 lowest 
recipient areas.  Despite the increasing skewness, the top subsidy recipient areas tend to 
persist over time.  In particular, the very high benefit per owner areas are heavily 
concentrated in California and the New York City to Boston corridor.  While taxes are 
somewhat higher in these places, it is high and rising house prices which appear most 
responsible for the large and increasing skewness in the spatial distribution of benefits.
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Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the favorable tax subsidy to homeownership in the United 
States stimulates the demand for housing, raising prices and increasing the homeownership rate.1 
That this subsidy comes at a significant cost is also well documented at the national level, with a 
number of authors having estimated the tax expenditure associated with the mortgage interest 
and property tax deductions as well as the untaxed return on housing equity.2   
Over time, these marginal incentives for homeownership – and the aggregate cost of 
those subsidies – have changed considerably.  For example, Poterba’s (1992) analysis of the 
impacts of the various tax reforms of the 1980s reports a significant increase in the marginal cost 
of owner-occupied housing between 1980 and 1990 across the income distribution, but 
particularly for high income owners, due in large part to a drop in marginal tax rates for high 
income households and an overall reduction in the progressivity of the tax code.  In our work 
below, we calculate that the real cost of the tax subsidy to homeownership has risen substantially 
in the last 20 years, from $198 billion (in 1999 dollars) in 1979, to $284 billion in 1989, and 
$420 billion in 1999.   
In addition, recent evidence shows that the value of the subsidy to owner-occupied 
housing varies dramatically over space.  Gyourko and Sinai (2003), using 1990 Census data, find 
that the benefits of the tax subsidy are highly skewed with just a handful of metropolitan areas 
reaping most of the net gains from the favored tax treatment of owner-occupiers. 
These sets of stylized facts naturally lead one to wonder whether the changes over time in 
marginal incentives for homeownership and in the aggregate cost of the homeownership subsidy 
                                                           
1 See Rosen (1989) for a classic analysis and Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999), Capozza, Green, and Hendershott 
(1996), and the report to the Ford Foundation by Green and Reschovsky (2001) for more recent investigations into 
how the tax code might function in these regards.   
2 For example, see Follain and Ling (1991) and Follain, Ling, and McGill (1998). 
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have also affected the geographic distribution of the benefits.  Because housing markets are 
inextricably tied to a physical location, and are not national in scope, knowing the extent to 
which the tax benefits vary spatially is important for determining the potential impact of any 
change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing.  Moreover, the nature of the spatial 
distribution of benefit flows is likely to be important for any consideration of the potential 
impacts on house prices, the homeownership rate, or the political economy of fundamental tax 
reform. 
In addition, knowledge of how the geographical distribution of program benefits changes 
also is useful for analysis of the spatial equity of the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing.  
For example, every year the Tax Foundation calculates each state’s ratio of federal spending 
received to taxes paid, and finds substantial variation across states.  Our results, that the benefits 
of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing vary spatially, suggest that this sort of calculation 
should include implicit tax expenditures and subsidies alongside the observable taxes and 
spending.  Indeed, many of the Tax Foundation’s states with the lowest ratios of spending to 
actual taxes paid are the same ones whose home owners receive the largest housing-related 
subsidies. 
In this paper, we examine how the spatial distribution of the tax subsidy to owner-
occupied housing changes over three decades.  Using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses, we 
calculate the value of the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing as the difference in ordinary 
state and federal income taxes currently paid by home owners and the taxes they would pay if the 
tax code treated them like landlords.  In the latter scenario, there is no preference for investing in 
one’s home relative to other assets. 
Interestingly, while we find that the marginal tax subsidy for homeownership has 
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decreased over the last 20 years on net, the aggregate value of the tax benefits actually increased. 
Our analysis indicates that this is due to rising house prices and growth in the number of 
homeowners more than offsetting the decline in average tax benefit per dollar of house.  In 
particular, the after-tax cost of a dollar of owner-occupied housing rose between 1979 and 1989 
before falling slightly by 1999, as the marginal tax rates on housing deductions were reduced and 
then increased.  All else constant, one would expect the value of the tax benefit to fall with tax 
rates.  However, this is not the case at the per-owner level, where the benefit remained flat 
during the 1980s before rising by 20 percent during the 1990s.  The fact that the aggregate 
subsidy rose substantially during the 1980s, from $198 billion in 1979 to $284 billion in 1989, is 
due at least in part to growth in the number of homeowners. 
In regard to the spatial distribution of the subsidy, these tax changes, increases in house 
prices, and growth in the number of homeowners were not individually neutral.  However, they 
happen to offset each other so that at the state level the spatial distribution of the tax benefits 
changes little over time.  At the metropolitan area level, however, spatial skewness of the 
subsidy has been increasing. This phenomenon appears to driven by the relatively large house 
price increases experienced in various coastal areas of California and in the Northeast between 
New York City and Boston.  Even so, the top recipients tend to persist; they just receive a larger 
fraction of the total subsidy over time. 
Among states, California always receives the largest gross subsidy flow, but this is not 
due solely to the fact that it has the most owners.  For example, in 2000 it received 18.7 percent 
of the aggregate subsidy while having only 9.4 percent of the nation’s owners.  That high ratio of 
benefits to owners applies to only a very small number of other states such as New York (9.5 
percent of total benefit flow while being home to only 5.3 percent of the nation’s owners in 
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2000), indicating that this program has highly spatially targeted beneficiaries.  This pattern of 
spatial skewness to where program benefits flow is even more extreme at the metropolitan area 
level.  Comparing subsidy flows in 1979 in the top 20 areas versus those in the bottom 20 areas 
finds that owners in the high recipient areas received from 2.7 to 8.0 times the subsidy reaped 
per owner in the bottom group.  By 1999, the analogous calculation finds the typical owner in 
the top twenty areas receiving from 3.4 to 17.1 times more benefits than owners in any of the 20 
lowest recipient areas.   
The precise economic implications of these results depend upon whether or not the 
subsidy is capitalized into land prices.  While such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this 
paper, the broad range of possible outcomes can be readily understood. If the subsidy were fully 
capitalized, eliminating it would not affect the user cost of owning but many owners in a few 
metropolitan areas would experience significant changes in wealth.  While the savings associated 
with eliminating the subsidy would be redistributed back to homeowners, the net wealth effect 
still could be significant in many areas regardless of how one thinks the tax benefits are 
financed. If the tax subsidy is not capitalized into land prices, then the user cost of ownership 
must reflect it. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, we describe the tax 
subsidy to owner-occupied housing and how we measure it.  Section two reports our results, 
beginning with an analysis of how benefits flow across states and followed by a description of 
the distribution across metropolitan areas.  Finally, there is a brief conclusion and summary. 
   
I. Measuring Housing-Related Tax Benefits 
The fact that there is a subsidy to owner-occupied housing can most easily be seen by 
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comparing the current tax treatment of home owners to how they would be taxed if housing were 
treated like any other asset.  In particular, owner-occupied housing gets favorable tax treatment, 
but housing owned by a landlord is treated like any other income-producing, depreciable asset.  
Both homeowners and landlords are allowed to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes as 
expenses (as long as the homeowner itemizes).  But a landlord must pay tax on her rental income 
while a homeowner does not.  The homeowner implicitly pays herself rent to occupy her house, 
but because she is both landlord and tenant, that transfer is tax-free whereas if the parties were 
distinct, the rent would be taxed.  On the other hand, landlords can deduct depreciation and 
maintenance, while homeowners cannot. 
It is apparent from this comparison that the tax subsidy to owner-occupancy arises 
largely from the non-taxation of the implicit rent on the home.  However, it is not so 
straightforward to compute the amount of the benefit.  Implicit rent is unobserved and the 
components of landlords’ tax bills are often difficult to estimate.  Instead, as we show below, it is 
much more straightforward to calculate the difference between the equilibrium taxes paid by 
homeowners and landlords.  Underlying this approach is the same assumption used in the 
familiar user cost of owning concept developed in Hendershott and Slemrod (1983) and Poterba 
(1984): the marginal home owner invests in owner-occupied housing until the point where the 
annual cost she incurs exactly equals the rent she would have to pay as a tenant in the same 
property.   
We begin with the equilibrium annual flow cost of owning.  That user cost is described in 
equation (1) and takes into account the fact that implicit rental income is untaxed while mortgage 
interest and property taxes are deductible for itemizers:   
(1) RH = (1-τded)αi + (1-τded)τp + (1-τint)(1-α)r + (1-τint)β + M + δ - ΠH.  
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The left-hand side variable, RH, is the annual cost of owner occupancy per dollar of housing 
value.  These costs include: (a) the after-tax cost of mortgage interest, (1-τded)αi, where α is the 
loan-to-value ratio on the house,  i is the mortgage interest rate, and τded is the owner-occupier’s 
marginal tax rate, equal to her marginal rate (denoted τint) if she itemizes and zero otherwise; (b) 
the after-tax cost of property tax payments, (1-τded)τp, with τp the effective property tax rate; (c) 
the after-tax opportunity cost of investing equity in the house rather than in some other riskless 
investment at rate of return, r; this is given by (1-τint)(1-α)r and is a cost to all owners, whether 
they itemize or not;3 (d) an after-tax risk premium, (1-τint)β, to account for the difference in risk 
between bonds and housing; this applies to the entire long position in the house and thus is 
unaffected by the choice of leverage;4 (e) annual maintenance costs per unit of housing which 
are given by M; (f) the cost of true economic depreciation per unit of house which is assumed to 
occur at rate δ; and (g) any annual appreciation in the house value, ΠH, which reduces the 
carrying cost.5 
 If the home owner were treated as a landlord, the residence would be taxed just like any 
other asset.  Neutral tax treatment obviously requires taxing the implicit rental income on the 
home, but if treated like landlords, owner occupiers also would be able to deduct maintenance 
                                                           
3Implicitly, we assume that the opportunity cost of tying up equity in a house is foregoing taxable returns.  If the 
home owner were to invest in a tax-exempt asset instead, we assume the return would be (1-τ)r rather than r, yielding 
the same after-tax return.  
4 In this framework, the homeowner’s financial position can be thought of as being long one house and short one 
bond (the mortgage).  This allows us to decompose the opportunity cost of being long the house as the riskless rate 
of return plus a premium that reflects the difference in risk between a bond position and an equivalent risk 
alternative to investing in housing. The difference between the mortgage interest rate and the equivalent duration 
riskless rate is reflected in the options to default on or prepay the mortgage.  These options have value to the owner, 
so the premium above the riskless rate for borrowing is rolled into the mortgage rate as a cost. 
5This specification treats capital gains on housing as untaxed and realized every year.  Given that there now is a 
$250,000 capital gains exclusion ($500,000 for married couples filing jointly) that can be applied every other year, 
this is not unrealistic.  Even in earlier periods, the assumption of no capital gains taxation on housing was valid for 
the vast majority of households. 
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expenses and depreciation, not just the mortgage interest and local property taxes presently 
allowed. In this case, a different annual cost would result, as described in equation (2): 
(2) RH’= (1-τ)αi + (1-τ)τp + (1-τ)(1-α)r + (1-τ)β + τ RH’ + (1-τ)M + (1-τ)δ - (1-τ)ΠH . 
With perfect competition in the rental housing market, rents must equal the annual cost, so τRH’ 
would be the tax due on imputed rent.6  Grouping the RH’ terms and dividing both sides by (1-τ) 
yields the simplified version in equation (3), 
(3) RH’ = αi + τp + (1-α)r + β + M + δ - ΠH.   
 One possible strategy to estimate the tax benefits of owner-occupancy would be to 
compute RH′ as the sum of the terms of on the right-hand side of equation (3), add that value to 
the homeowner’s reported income, and then determine the additional tax that would be paid.  
There are two important drawbacks to that approach.  One is that we do not have good data on 
maintenance, depreciation, or expected capital gains, so the estimate is likely to be a noisy one.  
The other is that simply adding the implicit rent to income does not accurately capture the impact 
of itemization rates because the tax rates on deductions differ for non-itemizers. 
 The alternative strategy we pursue in this paper is to compute the difference between RH’ 
and RH directly by subtracting equation (1) from (3).  Doing so yields the following: 
(4) RH’-RH = τdedαi + τded⋅(τp) + τint((1-α)r + β).7   
                                                           
6 This also assumes accrual taxation of capital gains which, when combined with statutory ordinary income and 
capital gains rates being equal, allows us to focus on program benefits arising from differential tax treatment of 
ordinary income.  As our 2003 paper shows, in this setting a dollar of house price appreciation has approximately the 
same value to owner-occupiers and landlords, so there is no differential impact on user costs.  The analysis behind 
this conclusion is fairly complex, and we refer the interested reader to that paper for the details.     
7Note that we have abstracted throughout from how many housing dollars on which a home owning family receives 
a subsidy.  A change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing might affect house values, but because we 
measure the subsidy on a per dollar basis, we abstract from the possibility that there is a second order effect through 
changes in house prices.  This is done for two reasons.  First, determining precisely how a change in the subsidy 
would be capitalized into house values is beyond the scope of this paper.  Second, any change in house price would 
only increase the magnitudes of our estimates.  For example, if the benefit to owner-occupied housing were reduced, 
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Not only does this approach get the impact of itemization correctly, but the terms for which we 
would have the most problems measuring accurately (M, δ, and П) difference out in the 
subtraction.  Thus, the tax subsidy to owner-occupancy can be computed as the sum of three 
components:  (a) the tax value of home mortgage interest deductions (τded⋅α⋅i); (b) the tax value 
of local property tax deductions (τded⋅τp); and (c) the tax that would have been paid on the equity 
invested in the home had it been invested elsewhere (τint⋅((1-α)⋅r+β)).8  While the sum of these 
three terms represents total ordinary income tax benefits to owner occupiers under the current 
code, we hasten to emphasize that this does not imply that mortgage interest or local property tax 
deductions themselves are responsible for creating the subsidy.  As noted above, the subsidy 
arises from the non-taxation of imputed rent.  It simply is the case algebraically that the subsidy 
can be represented by the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (4).  Looking at the 
deductions alone would underestimate the true subsidy. 
 
Estimation Strategy and Data 
The procedure for estimating the tax code-related subsidy to owner-occupiers is 
represented graphically in the tax schedule with three marginal tax brackets shown in Figure 1.  
A home-owning family with no housing-related deductions would have a taxable income (TI) of 
Y1.  However, if they were not owners, they may have invested their housing equity in a vehicle 
that yielded a taxable return that would raise their TI to Y2.  Thus, Y2 is the counterfactual TI for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
house prices might also fall, further decreasing the subsidy.  
8The depreciation term nets out because we have assumed landlords can deduct economic depreciation and, after 
1986, that is probably not far from the truth.  Deloitte and Touche (2000) and Gravelle (2001) conclude that 
economic lifetimes for rental properties in 1989 (and now) are somewhat shorter than the statutory lifetimes.  The 
statutory depreciable life in 1981 (of 15 years) was shorter than true economic depreciation, so we may overestimate 
the subsidy to owner-occupiers in 1979. 
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a home-owning family if it were to stop being an owner.  Starting with that TI, we can compute 
the tax value of each of the three aforementioned deductions.  With a taxable income of Y2, this 
hypothetical family would have a tax liability of T1.  Assume that claiming the home mortgage 
interest deduction (HMI) would lower TI to Y2−HMI (presuming for simplicity that all of HMI 
was above the standard deduction) and the tax liability to T2.  Therefore, the tax savings for this 
family from the mortgage interest deduction is T1−T2. 
Although in this example the mortgage interest deduction does not move the family into a 
lower tax bracket, the property tax deduction does.  Beginning with TI equal to Y2−HMI, we can 
compute the tax savings from the property tax deduction as the tax bill with only the mortgage 
interest deduction, T2, minus the tax bill with both the mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions, T3.  In this case, T2 and T3 span a kink in the tax schedule, but still account for the 
fact that the average tax rate is less than the marginal tax rate at Y2−HMI. 
Finally, we compute the value of the non-taxation of the return on housing equity.  
Because the return on housing equity is not included in TI, taxable income is measured at Y1 
instead of the greater amount Y2.  The tax value of not including that income is measured as the 
change in tax between T3 (the tax bill corresponding to a TI of Y2−HMI−Tp) and T4 (the tax bill 
corresponding to an TI of Y1−HMI−Tp).   
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the order in which the deductions are taken matters when 
the tax schedule is not linear.  For example, T1−T2 > T3−T4, even though HMI < Y1−Y2.  After 
adding back the implicit return on housing equity, we compute the deductions in the following 
order: (a) tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction; (b) the tax savings associated with 
the property tax deduction; and (c) the savings from the return on housing equity being untaxed.  
We have repeated the estimation using all six possible sequences in which the deductions can be 
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taken.  While the relative magnitudes of the categories change, the differences are minor. 
We calculate each of the tax liabilities T1 through T4 by combining tract level 
information covering the entire United States from the STF3 files of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 
decennial Censuses with the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM 
program.  TAXSIM calculates federal and state tax liabilities from our tax data and allows us to 
engage in a “what-if” calculation to determine what taxes would have been paid had a household 
not had various housing deductions or had invested in an asset with a taxable income stream.  
For each year in our data, the TAXSIM program incorporates all relevant federal and state tax 
law, including housing and property tax deductions. 
 To construct representative households to pass through the TAXSIM tax calculator, we 
start by computing the distribution of household income among homeowners at the tract level.9  
For each tract, we divide the household income distribution into deciles and assign the median 
income for each decile to all the households in that category.  Thus, the lowest-income one-tenth 
of the households are assumed to have an income equal to that of the fifth percentile for the tract, 
the next lowest-income tenth of the households are assigned an income equal to that of the 15th 
percentile for the tract, and so forth. 
We then map tract-level information on the distribution of house values, PH, to incomes 
by assigning to households in each decile of the income distribution the value corresponding to 
the same decile of the house value distribution.  For example, we assume that the household in 
the 5th percentile of the income distribution for the tract also owns the home in the 5th percentile 
                                                           
9All tax benefit figures reported in this paper are based on tract-level data that aggregates household income across 
its various sources. 
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of the housing price distribution for the same tract.10 
The actual value of the tax benefits depends on certain demographic data that are likely 
to affect the number of exemptions and the overall amount of deductions.  Tract level data that 
are available in each census year include the distribution of whether households are single, 
married, or single with children; the percentage of households with children; and the percentage 
of households over 65 years of age.  We create a representative household for each possible 
combination of these characteristics and then compute the weighted average estimated tax, 
where the weights are the tract-level distributions of the demographic characteristics. 
Unfortunately, the census data lack information on most non-housing categories of 
potential tax deductions.  We compute mortgage interest, state tax, and property tax deductions, 
but we do not observe medical expenses, charitable giving, deductible interest (other than for a 
home mortgage), and several other miscellaneous categories.  Two countervailing problems arise 
from underestimating possible deductions.  First, we would be more likely to incorrectly assume 
the family does not itemize.  This error would cause us to underestimate the tax value of the 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions since less would be deducted at the margin.  On 
the other hand, undercounting deductions for itemizers could increase the tax value we do 
measure since the remaining deductions are applied against higher marginal tax rates.  
Consequently, we impute missing tax deductions to our census data based on data from the 
Department of the Treasury’s Statistics of Income (SOI) public use tax micro sample.  A 
                                                           
10This matching process presumes that owners and renters in a tract have identical income distributions.  
Fortunately, our spatial results are robust to assuming an extreme case in which all the owners in a tract have a 
higher income than any of the renters, and houses are matched to owners so that the highest income owner owns the 
highest value house, the next highest income owner occupies the next highest valued house, and so forth.  In reality, 
any sorting into houses by income would not be perfect, as is suggested by the data in O’Sullivan et al (1995) which 
matches tax returns and property tax assessments in California.  Unfortunately, those data are no longer available.  
However, for the 1989 data we have tried using the mean income and house value in each tract, rather than the full 
distribution, and it does not make any qualitative difference to the spatial skewness we observe.   
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modified Heckman-style sample selection model is employed to correct for the selective 
observing of deductions only by itemizers.11   
Following the procedure shown in Figure 1, we augment the observed income by an 
estimate of how much higher the household’s income would have been had they invested in an 
equivalently risky taxable asset rather than housing.  First, we calculate the opportunity cost of 
the equity in one’s home, or PH*((1-α)*r + β), where r is the riskless yield on seven-year 
Treasuries in the relevant census year: 9.47, 8.57, and 5.79 percent, respectively.  Then we 
compute β: the risk premium for the whole house.12  The estimates below assume that the 
expected equivalent-risk opportunity cost of investing in a house was equal to the geometric 
mean on the value-weighted S&P500 return (including dividends) over a certain time period.  
For simplicity, we assume the relevant period always runs from the beginning of 1926 to the end 
of the census year (i.e., 1926-1979, 1926-1989, and 1926-1999), yielding expected returns of 
8.79, 10.13, and 11.22 percent, respectively.  The risk premium is the difference between this 
yield and the risk-free yield.  Thus, for 1989, we define β to be the 10.13 percent S&P500 return 
minus the 8.57 percent Treasury yield, for a premium of 1.56 percentage points.  The opportunity 
cost of riskless equity and the risk premium are then added to income. 
                                                           
11The interested reader should see the Appendix to Gyourko & Sinai (2003) for a detailed description of the 
procedure.  The imputation results indicate that, absent the correction, we would have underestimated deductions 
and therefore the number of itemizers.  This turns out to be important because the underestimation of itemizers was 
not random across space.  In high house value and high income tax states such as California, not observing non-
housing deductions only infrequently caused us to miscategorize an owner family as a non-itemizer.  Home 
mortgage interest, local property taxes, and state income taxes generally were sufficient to make California residents 
itemizers.  This was not the case in many states with lower house values and lower state taxes.  Hence, the 
imputation has an important effect on the measured spatial distribution of program benefits. 
12 The risk adjustment follows from Poterba (1991), with the calculation effectively assuming that the mortgage rate 
would be the yield on seven-year Treasuries in the absence of the options to prepay or default.  Other assumptions 
regarding the relative risk of owner-occupied housing obviously could be made, as there is no clear agreement on 
this issue.  However, we have repeated all the analyses reported in the paper under widely varying assumptions 
about the relative risk of owner-occupied housing.  While the aggregate subsidy certainly does vary with the 
presumed opportunity cost of equity in the home, the nature of the spatial distribution of the subsidy across states 
and metropolitan areas largely is unaffected. 
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We estimate the value of the mortgage interest deduction by computing each tract-
decile’s tax value as the weighted average difference in tax bills with and without it.  The 
mortgage interest deduction itself is defined as PH*α*i.  Leverage ratios, α, vary by age and are 
computed from household data in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) closest in time to the 
relevant census year.  A weighted average leverage for each tract was computed based on the 
tract’s age distribution.13  The mortgage interest rate, i, was calculated by taking an average 
across households in the same SCFs.  From the 1983 SCF, which is the closest in time to 1979, 
we calculate the average mortgage rate was 10.21 percent.  For 1989, the analogous rate was 
9.56 percent, with a rate of 7.85 percent matched from the 1998 SCF to the 1999 census data. 
The tax value of the mortgage interest deduction can differ from mortgage interest paid 
times the marginal tax rate for three reasons.  First, only families that itemize on their tax returns 
receive any benefit on the margin from the deductibility of mortgage interest.  Also, only the 
excess of the mortgage interest deduction plus other itemized deductions over the standard 
deduction has value for a taxpayer.  Therefore, we would only multiply the portion of mortgage 
interest in excess of the standard deduction (after itemizing all other non-housing related 
deductions first) by the tax rate.  Additionally, since the tax schedule is nonlinear, taking the 
mortgage interest deduction may lower the taxpayer’s marginal and average tax rates. 
The second component involves the value of the deduction of local property taxes.  
Property tax payments themselves are defined as PH*τp, where τp is the average effective 
property tax rate.  We were not able to find reliable estimates for this variable over time.  
                                                           
13There is considerable heterogeneity in leverage by age in all years.  For example, in 1998, loan-to-value ratios by 
age are as follows: 20-24 year olds – 66.5 percent; 25-29 year olds – 64.2 percent; 30-34 year olds – 62.6 percent; 
35-39 year olds – 61.0 percent; 40-44 year olds – 52.3 percent; 45-49 year olds – 44.5 percent; 50-54 year olds – 
41.3 percent; 55-59 year olds – 30.9 percent; 60-64 year olds – 21.3 percent; 65-69 year olds – 13.2 percent; 70-74 
year olds – 9.6 percent; and 75+ year olds – 4.6 percent.  Leverage in previous decades is, on average, lower.  
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Consequently, we use information for an intermediate year—1990.14  This variable is allowed to 
vary by metropolitan area using data provided by Stephen Malpezzi, who has calculated average 
property tax rates in 1990 for a large number of areas.  Census tracts not located within 
metropolitan areas covered in the Malpezzi data are assigned the average state-level local 
property tax rate as reported by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR (1987)).15  The tax value of the deduction associated with these payments then is 
computed the same way as for the mortgage interest deduction.   
The third term we estimate arises from the fact that the government does not tax as 
income the return home owners could have earned on their equity had they not invested in their 
homes.  We calculate the reduction in tax liabilities that occurs when we remove the imputed 
income that we had added in the first step.  This approach accounts for the possibility that a 




Summary Statistics for the Nation 
The national aggregate gross value to owners of housing-related ordinary income tax 
benefits, reported in the first panel of Table 1, is quite large and has risen over time—from $198 
billion in 1979 to $284 billion in 1989 to $420 billion in 1999 (in constant 1999 dollars).16  
                                                           
14 Property taxes are such a small component of the total subsidy – about 10 percent – that the noise in this measure 
probably has little qualitative effect on our conclusions. 
15 The ACIR did not report state-by-state breakdowns for 1989, so we use the 1987 data.  We have also 
experimented with assuming a 1 percent and 1.5 percent national average effective rate.  Our findings are not 
sensitive to these changes. 
16 The bulk of the tax code-related benefits to owners arises from the third of the three components from equation 
(4).  Depending upon the census year, from two-thirds to three-quarters of the total benefits are due to not having to 
pay tax on the return to equity invested in the home plus the difference in expected return on housing versus the cost 
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These subsidies are large and are significantly higher than those typically reported by Treasury 
or the Joint Committee on Taxation primarily because those government agencies calculate only 
the traditional tax expenditures – the tax cost of the mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions – rather than the failure to tax implicit rent.  Since houses are only partially leveraged 
and the expected return on a house is greater than mortgage rates, those deductions measure only 
a portion of the true tax expenditure.17  In addition, our figures include state tax subsidies. 
The housing subsidy is sizeable – and growing – even on a per owner or per household 
basis.  While the aggregate real subsidy amount increased 112 percent since 1979, the number of 
owner-occupied units rose just 70 percent between 1979 and 1999 (from 40.9 million in 1979 to 
69.7 million in 1999) so the subsidy per owner-occupied household has been going up.  Gross 
program benefits per owner-occupied household were $4,840 in 1979, remained constant over 
the ensuing decade with the 1989 figure being $4,818, and then rose in the 1990s to $6,024 in 
1999.  The analogous figures on a per household basis range from just over three thousand 
dollars in 1979 to just over four thousand dollars in 1999. 
While it has long been understood that the subsidy is skewed in aggregate towards those 
with high incomes and high house values, much less is known about the spatial skewness of this 
aspect of the tax code.  It is to that issue we now turn.  We begin by documenting just how the 
tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing is skewed, describe how that skewness changes over 
time, and then investigate the factors driving any changes in the distribution of the subsidy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the mortgage.  Results on the decomposition of the subsidy are available upon request. 
17 Our estimates of the tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction alone are quite close to, but lower than, 
what we obtain by looking at actual tax return data.  We cannot use the Statistics of Income data to compute the full 
tax expenditure because tax return data do not include information about house values, only itemized deductions.  In 
addition, the SOI data do not report state of residence for taxpayers with AGI above a threshold, so our calculations 
using the SOI are also below the true figure.  On the other hand, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s projected tax 
expenditure on mortgage interest deductions for 1999 (these do not include state taxes) is slightly lower than what 
we calculate. 
 18
across states and metropolitan areas.   
State-Level Results 
 While we will focus most of our analysis on the amount of tax benefits per owner, we 
begin with the most basic measure of the spatial distribution of the benefits: the aggregate 
benefit flow for each state by year.  Not surprisingly, the most populous state, California, stands 
out in Table 2, with its owners receiving gross benefits of nearly $40 billion in 1979, well over 
$60 billion in 1989, and almost $80 billion in 1999.  No other state approaches these levels, 
although the benefit flow to New York has risen dramatically over time.  A closer examination 
shows that, as the national aggregate value of the subsidy increases, the additional benefits 
appear to be distributed in rough proportion to where they were already going.  That is, while the 
aggregate benefit to California doubles between 1979 and 1999, so does the subsidy to small 
beneficiaries such as Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina.  Thus, the states tend to maintain 
their same relative standing, but the absolute (real) dollar difference between the highest and 
lowest recipient increases substantially. 
 Of course, changes in aggregate subsidy flows are heavily affected by population growth. 
To net out differential increases in the number of homeowners, Figure 2 reports benefits scaled 
by the number of owners in each state in 1979 and 1999.18  Even on a per owner basis, people in 
only a handful of states, often the most populous ones, reap substantially more from tax code-
related housing benefits than the typical owner nationally.  For example, while California is no 
longer the extreme outlier it was in the aggregate data in Table 2, it still is one of only seven 
states that received at least $6,000 per owner in 1979 and at least $8,000 per owner in 1999.  
Overall, the per owner subsidies in the top few states are well over double those received by 
                                                           
18 Data for all three years – 1979, 1989, and 1999 – is reported in the Appendix. 
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owners in the vast majority of states.  Thus, while the Gini coefficients for the distribution of per 
owner benefits across states are relatively low in each decade (0.20 in 1979, 0.32 in 1989, and 
0.25 in 1999), it would not be accurate to consider the benefit distribution an especially 
egalitarian one in spatial terms.   
 Although the subsidy per owned unit has risen over time, the skewness has persisted at 
least since 1979.  Benefit flows always are concentrated in the hands of owners in just a few 
states and the top three states have remained there for the last 20 years.  However, the spatial 
distribution has changed some with owners in northeastern states doing better over time.   
 Of course, Figure 2 confounds changes in the national level of subsidy with its 
distribution across space.  However, the typical state receives less than the national average 
benefit per owner, with a few states receiving about double the average.  These disparities rise 
between 1979 and 1989, but are mitigated somewhat by 1999.19 To isolate the spatial distribution 
from the dollar value of the subsidy, we have computed the ratio of each state’s share of the 
subsidy to its share of the nation’s owners.  For example, the median state has a ratio of subsidy 
share to owner share of 0.83 in 1979, 0.71 in 1989, and 0.76 in 1999.  These generally are less 
than half of California’s numbers which are 1.77 in 1979, 2.29 in 1989, and 2.00 in 1999.20  
 Figure 3 provides more detail on the heterogeneity in benefit changes by state over the 
1980s and 1990s by measuring each state’s changes relative to the national average change.  The 
top panel highlights that owners in northeastern and mid-Atlantic states did better than average 
in the 1980s.  California and Hawaii are the only exceptions to that statement.  There was less 
                                                           
19 While one cannot compute transfers across states without making assumptions regarding how the program is 
financed, it seems certain that transfers are flowing from a host of states to owners in California and a select few 
other states.  See our 2003 paper for transfer estimates assuming lump sum and proportional financing schemes using 
1990 data.  In both cases, the outcome is the majority of states transferring resources to owners in the smaller 
number of other states.   
20 While Hawaii’s and the District of Columbia’s ratios are higher in each decade, California’s are more relevant 
empirically because of its very large number of owners. 
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heterogeneity in the 1990s, and it was owners in the less populous western states of Colorado, 
Oregon, and Utah who experienced significantly greater than average increases that decade.  
Owners in California and Hawaii received smaller than average benefit flow increases that 
decade.      
 As suggested in the introduction, many factors have changed over time that could 
influence the value of the tax benefits associated with owner-occupancy.  The most obvious is 
tax rates themselves.  Because owner-occupied housing is a true tax shelter in the sense that one 
can deduct expenses without declaring any income on the asset, a reduction in tax rates naturally 
lowers the value of the tax shelter.  Figure 4 plots the ‘average’ marginal tax rate (state+federal) 
on housing deductions for 1979 and 1999, calculated using the Census data and the NBER’s 
TAXSIM program.  While marginal rates do differ across states, those differences have declined 
over time.  Overall, marginal rates fell significantly during the 1980s and then rose modestly 
during the 1990s due to a series of tax reforms at the federal level. 21   
 That aggregate benefits rose and benefits per owner did not decline on average between 
1979 and 1989 indicates that other factors were changing to counterbalance the negative effect 
that an increase in the tax price of housing would have on the value of the benefit.  In addition, 
the fact that most of the important tax changes were at the federal level may help explain why 
the nature of the spatial distribution across states was not affected very much.  
 Other components of the subsidy were changing, of course, and house prices in 
particular.  Figure 5 graphs mean house price by state in 1979, 1989, and 1999, with Figure 6 
reporting the percentage changes over time for each state.  Values in many of the coastal states in 
                                                           
21 Like tax rates, the probability of itemizing declined significantly between 1979 and 1999, reducing the subsidy to 
owner-occupied housing.  Changes in the spatial distribution of itemizers, once one nets out the effect of house 
prices on the likelihood of itemization, do not seem to determine the changes in the benefits.  This is not surprising 
since we saw in section I that itemization only affects the value of a small portion of the tax subsidy. 
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particular have skyrocketed over the past 20 years.  In California, mean real prices rose from just 
over $200,000 in 1979 to nearly $300,000 in 1999.  The change has been even more dramatic in 
places such as Massachusetts, where the average home was worth a little more than $100,000 in 
1979.  One decade later, mean prices had doubled (in real terms), and prices held firm in that 
state during the 1990s.  It seems clear that it is this type of change that has allowed the average 
subsidy per owner in Massachusetts to rise so much over the past two decades.  Indeed, a 
comparison of Figures 3 and 6 suggests that rising real house prices can help account for the 
dramatic increases in benefits per owner that have occurred in a small number of states, 
especially northeastern ones in the 1980s.   
 Of course, there are other factors at work, including the rising return in equity markets 
which raises the value of the tax shield on home equity in our calculations.  While a detailed 
decomposition analysis of changes in the tax benefit over time is beyond the scope of this study, 
the data show that the factors that do change did so in a largely offsetting fashion with respect to 
the spatial distribution across states in the 1980s.  The rise in aggregate and per owner benefits in 
the 1990s probably reflects a growing share of households that are owners, rising real house 
prices, and increasing tax rates.  On net, the spatial distribution of benefits across states is fairly 
skewed in each census year, with very few states experiencing significant changes in their 
relative status.  Whether this holds at the metropolitan area level is the subject of the following 
subsection.      
Between-Metropolitan Area Results 
In this subsection, we disaggregate the data further to examine subsidy flows at the 
metropolitan area level and find that the distribution of housing benefits are more skewed than at 
the state level, and that skewness is increasing over time.  Results are computed for 380 areas 
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that were identifiable Census Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs).22   
Aggregate benefit flows at the CBSA level, which are reported for selected areas in the 
Appendix, document how extremely spatially targeted are the overall benefit flows.  The vast 
majority of metropolitan areas receive a relatively modest benefit flow, while a relatively small 
number of areas receive very large aggregate benefit flows.   
This form of spatial skewness also has increased over time at the metropolitan area level. 
 For example, if we focus just on the three CBSAs that contain the nation’s three largest cities of 
New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, their owners received benefit flows equal to $27.3 
billion in 1979.  While being home to just 10.1 percent of all owners living in designated 
metropolitan areas in the 1980s, they received 14.7 percent of all benefits flowing to 
metropolitan census tracts.  By 1989, the spatial skewness of aggregate tax subsidy flows had 
become even more extreme.  Owners in just these three CBSAs received 17.7 percent of all 
metropolitan area benefits while constituting an even smaller share of the nation’s owners at 9.3 
percent.  The share of owners in these areas had fallen to 8.5 percent by 1999, but their benefit 
share was 1.72 times higher at 14.6 percent.   
Figure 7, which plots benefits scaled by the number of owners in the CBSA, highlights 
that the subsidy flows disproportionately towards owners in a relatively small number of 
metropolitan areas and that the skewness is increasing over time.  In this figure, CBSAs are 
ordered by their per-owner subsidy.  Thus, the more extreme curvature in the graphs as the 
                                                           
22Benefit flows to census tracts not located within CBSAs are not included in the figures reported in this section.  
CBSAs are Census’s new (2003) county-based definition of metropolitan areas.  We apply the same definition in 
each of the three Census files, realizing of course that the economic relationship between the counties is weaker 
earlier in previous decades.  By construction, a CBSA must contain at least one urban area of 10,000 or more 
population. The county (or counties) “in which at least 50 percent of the population resides within urban areas of 
10,000 or more population, or that contain at least 5,000 people residing within a single urban area of 10,000 or 
more population, is identified as a "central county"” and is included in the CBSA.  Additional "outlying counties" 
are included in the CBSA if they meet specified requirements of commuting to or from the central counties. 
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decades progress is an indication that spatial skewness, net of population changes, has been on 
the rise. 
This is made even more clear in Tables 3 and 4, which report the top and bottom 20 
CBSAs in terms of benefits per owner in 1979 and 1999, respectively.  (We limit consideration 
to the 179 CBSAs that are above the median in terms of the number of households. 23)  The table 
also includes per household values of the subsidy, although the sorting is on a per owner basis. 
These two tables make clear that there are very wide disparities in the size of benefit 
flows across places.  For example, Table 3 documents that in 1979 an owner in one of the top 20 
areas received from three to eight times the benefit flow of an owner in one of the bottom 20 
areas.24  The differentials are narrower on a per household basis, with households in the top 
twenty areas having benefit flows that are from 2 to 4 times those in the bottom twenty areas.  
While differences in ownership rates – which are lower in the top subsidy areas – do account for 
some of the gap between the top and bottom recipient areas, the disparity still is large even on a 
per household basis. 
Table 4’s figures based on 1999 data indicate that the differentials widened considerably 
over the ensuing two decades.  For example, a comparison of the per owner subsidy in the 20th 
highest ranked area (Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI, Metropolitan Division) with the 
same figure for the 20th lowest ranked area (Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA, MSA) finds a ratio of 
3.4 to 1—or 1.3 times the ratio for the analogously ranked areas in 1979.  Comparing the 10th 
highest area’s (Honolulu, HI, MSA) benefit per owner value with that for the 10th lowest area 
                                                           
23 The top twenty areas in terms of benefits per owner are virtually unchanged by restricting the sample to more 
populous areas containing more than the median number of households.  This is not the case among the bottom 
twenty areas.  If the full sample of 380 CBSAs is used, Texas is even more overrepresented as it contains a large 
number of less populous metropolitan areas.   
24 These ranges were determined by computing the ratio of benefit per owner in the top-ranked area versus the 
bottom ranked area, from the second-to-highest ranked area versus the second-to-lowest ranked area, and so forth. 
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(Fort Smith, AR-OK, MSA) finds a ratio of 5.6 to 1—which is 1.5 times the ratio for similarly 
ranked areas in 1979.  The disparity widens even further when comparing the top-ranked area 
(San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA, Metropolitan Division) to the bottom-ranked area 
(McAllen-Edinberg-Pharr, TX, MSA) in terms of benefit per owner, with a ratio of 17.1 to 1 
($26,385/$1,541).  Thus, the top recipient areas are receiving relatively more per area than the 
bottom ranked areas in 1999 than in 1979.  Moreover, the benefits flowing to owners in the very 
top areas rose by 50-100 percent in real terms, while they were flat or declined slightly in the 
very bottom-ranked areas. 
An even clearer face can be put on the skewness depicted in Figure 7 by examining who 
and where the top and bottom recipient areas are on a per owner basis.  Fourteen of the top 20 
areas appear in both 1979 and 1999.  They include Honolulu, HI, Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, 
CT, Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg, MD, Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI, and ten areas 
spanning the length of California’s coastline.  By 1999, a series of areas, primarily located along 
the New York City-Boston corridor (Suffolk County-Nassau County, NY, New York-Wayne-
White Plains, NY-NJ, Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA, Boston-Quincy, MA, and Newark-
Union, NJ-PA) joined the top 20 list, replacing midwestern areas such as Ann Arbor, MI, 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI, and Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI, along with 
Anchorage, AK, and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV.  Thus, the top 
recipient areas have become even more dominated by coastal areas, with the northeast being 
much more heavily represented in the 1999 rankings.25  There is less stability among the bottom 
twenty ranked areas, with ten being present in both 1979 and 1999.  Moreover, this group always 
has a very strong southern representation (especially, but not exclusively, Texas), and the 
                                                           
25 The only interior area to join the top twenty list in 1999 was Boulder, CO. 
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metropolitan areas tend not to situated along the Atlantic or Pacific coasts. 
In sum, the spatial skewness of benefit flows per owner has grown over time, with the top 
areas now receiving very large multiples of the subsidy received by the bottom areas.  
Geographically, this skewness now is a bi-coastal phenomenon, with metropolitan areas 
spanning the state of California and between New York and Boston dominating the top 20 
benefit per owner rankings.  Still, there is strong persistence over time in the areas that receive 
the most benefit, and their share of the total has been rising. 
Because the most important tax code changes tend to have occurred at the federal level, 
plots of tax rates and tax rate changes at the metropolitan level are not particularly helpful in 
increasing our understanding of these results.  In contrast, examining house prices over time at 
the local level is very illuminating.  For example, Figure 8’s plots of the distribution of mean 
house values by metropolitan area over time look strikingly similar to the distributions of 
benefits per owner in Figure 7.  While it is the case that incomes and tax rates are somewhat 
higher in coastal metropolitan areas, those differences are not nearly as pronounced as for house 
values.  Thus, it is rising real house prices, especially in key coastal metropolitan areas, 
augmented by generally higher tax rates in those areas, that is increasing the absolute and 
relative benefits flowing to their owners.  Because how the housing is financed has only a 
second-order effect (through itemization) on the value of the subsidy, it is not necessary for 
households to refinance their houses to increase their subsidies.  Since higher prices reflect 
higher implicit rental value, if housing were treated symmetrically tax revenues would increase 




 Estimating the tax subsidy to home owners by comparing the taxes they now pay with 
those they would pay if they faced neutral tax treatment – like landlords, in our example – shows 
a substantial increase in the value of the tax benefit over time.  While some of the aggregate 
increase clearly is due to a rise in the number of homeowners, benefits per owner are about 20 
percent higher in 1999 than they were in 1979 at the national level.  This is particularly 
interesting given that it occurs despite marginal and average tax rates falling over the past two 
decades.  The evidence suggests that rising house prices, especially in key coastal areas and in 
certain regions of the country, can help account for the fact that the value of the subsidy has risen 
even though the tax subsidy per dollar of housing has declined.   
 Spatially, we demonstrate that the subsidy flows disproportionately to owners in a 
relatively small number of states—California, especially.  Spatial skewness is even more 
extreme at the metropolitan level, and the data indicate that skewness there has increased over 
time, though the top recipient areas tend to remain so.  Rising house prices in certain coastal 
metropolitan areas appear to play a large role in explaining this phenomenon. 
 While the magnitude and skewness of the subsidy are striking, one note of caution is in 
order when interpreting these results.  While it may appear that current homeowners in some 
parts of the country reap a large tax subsidy, their house prices may be higher to reflect it. That 
is, the after-tax annual cost of housing in high-subsidy areas may not differ from low-subsidy 
areas by the full amount of the tax benefit.  In the extreme case, if house prices have fully 
capitalized the benefit, current homeowners are no better off on a flow basis. 
 Computing the incidence of the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing – the degree to 
which the subsidy shows up in higher house prices rather than as a reduced flow cost of 
homeownership – is beyond the scope of this paper.  In addition, there is no consensus in the 
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economics literature on the answer: estimates range from full capitalization to very low 
capitalization.26  Unfortunately, where the incidence lies has crucial implications for public 
policy.  For example, it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that, due to the spatial inequity 
of the tax subsidy to owner occupied housing, policymakers should restructure the tax benefit.  
But if a reduction in benefit is capitalized into house prices, current homeowners may experience 
a loss of wealth.  If those homeowners had been the beneficiaries of the rise in house prices when 
the tax subsidy increased, such a reduction in asset value might be equitable.  However, it is 
quite likely that current homeowners purchased their house with the tax benefit already 
capitalized into the price, paying more on the expectation of future subsidies. 
  The degree of the capitalization of the subsidy into house prices also is unlikely to be 
spatially neutral.  In places where land is in short supply, an increase in demand for housing is 
likely to show up more in house prices than it would in cities where it is easy to add more 
housing stock.  That housing demand can be created by local economic factors or the subsidy to 
owner occupied housing. Thus, for the same underlying economic reasons, places where the tax 
benefit is the greatest are places with high land prices and also places where the subsidy is more 
likely to be capitalized into the house price.  While we cannot say how much of any reduction in 
the tax benefit would show up as lower house prices, it seems likely that a larger fraction (of a 
larger benefit) would be reflected in house prices in the high benefit areas.
                                                           
26 For examples, see Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) and Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996). 
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 Table 1:  Aggregate Tax Subsidy, National Level, by Year 
  

















Table 2:  Aggregate Benefit Flow in Billions of $1999
By State and Year
1979 1989 1999
Alabama $1.80 $2.25 $4.18
Alaska $0.38 $0.40 $0.67
Arizona $2.69 $3.23 $6.55
Arkansas $0.65 $1.17 $2.09
California $38.07 $63.73 $78.66
Colorado $3.37 $3.07 $8.56
Connecticut $4.29 $8.10 $8.23
Delaware $0.58 $0.89 $1.20
District of Columbia $0.99 $1.23 $1.41
Florida $8.61 $11.83 $19.62
Georgia $3.63 $5.30 $10.49
Hawaii $1.81 $2.70 $2.91
Idaho $0.43 $0.65 $1.55
Illinois $9.92 $11.87 $19.71
Indiana $3.01 $3.31 $6.13
Iowa $1.43 $1.70 $3.07
Kansas $1.77 $1.94 $2.93
Kentucky $1.28 $1.89 $3.81
Louisiana $2.22 $2.04 $3.49
Maine $0.54 $1.37 $1.59
Maryland $4.53 $7.42 $9.56
Massachusetts $5.12 $11.84 $14.03
Michigan $10.39 $9.92 $17.59
Minnesota $4.11 $4.14 $7.67
Mississippi $1.01 $1.11 $2.00
Missouri $2.61 $3.64 $6.11
Montana $0.43 $0.49 $1.04
Nebraska $0.76 $0.85 $1.67
Nevada $0.82 $0.93 $2.30
New Hampshire $0.64 $1.60 $1.74
New Jersey $8.96 $15.01 $17.60
New Mexico $0.84 $1.12 $2.15
New York $15.20 $32.99 $39.72
North Carolina $2.59 $5.03 $10.54
North Dakota $0.26 $0.27 $0.41
Ohio $8.09 $7.82 $13.32
Oklahoma $1.77 $1.72 $2.67
Oregon $2.87 $2.50 $6.48
Pennsylvania $8.80 $10.45 $13.82
Rhode Island $0.80 $1.48 $1.49
South Carolina $1.48 $2.48 $4.76
South Dakota $0.23 $0.24 $0.48
Tennesseee $2.26 $2.84 $5.61
Texas $9.12 $8.88 $15.60
Utah $1.22 $1.14 $3.21
Vermont $0.11 $0.59 $0.72
Virginia $5.30 $7.82 $10.90
Washington $4.04 $4.77 $9.52
West Virginia $0.87 $0.90 $1.40
Wisconsin $4.90 $5.11 $8.64
Wyoming $0.31 $0.22 $0.46
Top 20 (by 1979 per owner)
CBSA Name 1979 1979
Honolulu, HI Metropolitan Statistical Area $13,491 $7,132
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA Metropolitan Division $13,126 $6,156
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $11,320 $6,830
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $10,731 $5,615
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA Metropolitan Division $10,719 $6,430
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg, MD Metropolitan Division $10,669 $7,080
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT Metropolitan Statistical Area $10,189 $6,870
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Metropolitan Division $9,585 $4,621
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $8,758 $4,813
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI Metropolitan Division $8,637 $6,236
Anchorage, AK Metropolitan Statistical Area $8,616 $4,843
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $8,598 $5,332
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $8,553 $5,744
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Metropolitan Division $8,427 $4,856
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Division $8,349 $4,425
Salinas, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $8,037 $4,549
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI Metropolitan Statistical Area $7,738 $4,611
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $7,677 $4,857
Ann Arbor, MI Metropolitan Statistical Area $7,483 $4,094
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI Metropolitan Division $7,387 $5,689
CBSA Name 1979 1979
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $1,687 $1,173
Waco, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,010 $1,252
Fort Smith, AR-OK Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,177 $1,490
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,180 $1,539
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,247 $1,332
Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,294 $1,751
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,303 $1,614
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,307 $1,564
Columbus, GA-AL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,418 $1,496
Johnstown, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,418 $1,740
Jacksonville, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,564 $1,670
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,599 $1,848
Chattanooga, TN-GA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,602 $1,800
Fayetteville, NC Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,612 $1,619
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,628 $1,885
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,652 $2,001
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,652 $1,896
Macon, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,667 $1,666
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,733 $1,855
Springfield, MO Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,760 $1,851
Note:  Median number of households in 1979 among all 380 CBSAs is 56,664
Table 3: Benefits Per Owner and Per Household, Select CBSA's above median pop, 1979
Subsidy Per Owner Occupied Unit Subsidy Per Household
Subsidy Per Owner Occupied Unit Subsidy Per Household
Top 20 Areas by per owner subsidy, 1979
Bottom 20 Areas by per owner subsidy, 1979
CBSA Name 1999 1999
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA Metropolitan Division $26,385 $13,327
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $24,629 $14,874
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT Metropolitan Statistical Area $17,418 $12,075
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $16,759 $9,593
Suffolk County-Nassau County, NY Metropolitan Division $15,655 $12,520
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Metropolitan Division $15,151 $9,189
New York-Wayne-White Plains, NY-NJ Metropolitan Division $14,776 $6,123
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA Metropolitan Division $14,593 $8,953
Salinas, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $14,554 $7,994
Honolulu, HI Metropolitan Statistical Area $14,115 $7,944
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $13,030 $8,338
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $12,895 $8,734
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA Metropolitan Division $12,643 $7,804
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Metropolitan Division $12,096 $5,845
Boulder, CO Metropolitan Statistical Area $11,855 $7,719
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area $11,641 $6,476
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg, MD Metropolitan Division $11,223 $7,894
Boston-Quincy, MA Metropolitan Division $10,941 $6,389
Newark-Union, NJ-PA Metropolitan Division $10,870 $6,823
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI Metropolitan Division $10,700 $8,127
CBSA Name 1999 1999
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $1,541 $1,126
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $1,696 $1,149
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,027 $1,428
El Paso, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,153 $1,380
Lubbock, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,326 $1,380
Corpus Christi, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,341 $1,483
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,345 $1,329
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,448 $1,765
Ocala, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,466 $1,969
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,528 $1,855
Fort Smith, AR-OK Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,537 $1,785
Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,789 $2,136
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,866 $2,162
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,873 $1,901
San Antonio, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area $2,931 $1,891
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area $3,000 $2,134
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area $3,069 $2,275
Charleston, WV Metropolitan Statistical Area $3,071 $2,272
Mobile, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area $3,087 $2,158
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area $3,156 $2,199
Note:  Median number of households in 1999 among all 380 CBSAs is 92,249.
Table 4: Benefits Per Owner and Per Household, Select CBSA's above median pop, 1999
Subsidy Per Owner Occupied Unit Subsidy Per Household
Subsidy Per Owner Occupied Unit Subsidy Per Household
Bottom 20 areas by per owner subsidy, 1999






































































































































































































































































































































































































































1979 Subsidy per OU 1999 Subsidy per OU
Figure 3: Changes in Benefits per Owner Relative to National 
Average, by State
Change in Average Benefits Per Owner 
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1979 Marginal Tax Rate 1999 Marginal Tax Rate
Figure 5: Average House Prices by State
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Percentage Change in Mean House Prices, by State








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Benefits Per Owner, by Metropolitan Area and Year
























Figure 8: Mean House Value By Metro Area and Year



























Appendix Table A: Selected Data for U.S. States
state name
1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999
alabama 1,802,227,840      2,253,063,424      4,175,816,448      2,675        2,121        3,318        673,806 1,062,054 1,258,635 96,129 82,428 106,983 26.9% 21.9% 24.9%
alaska 379,607,232         397,060,160         672,533,120         7,947        3,746        4,856        47,765 105,994 138,502 205,408 135,935 157,736 37.8% 24.8% 25.5%
arizona 2,690,386,432      3,231,756,288      6,554,214,400      4,984        3,678        5,069        539,757 878,580 1,292,938 148,093 123,851 149,931 32.3% 25.8% 26.8%
arkansas 650,788,864         1,167,047,424      2,090,370,944      2,790        1,882        2,890        233,238 620,027 723,428 92,488 70,168 87,847 26.1% 21.0% 25.5%
california 38,067,302,400    63,727,050,752    78,659,928,064    8,545        11,041      12,020      4,455,057 5,772,075 6,544,294 235,602 319,707 288,367 37.0% 31.5% 32.3%
colorado 3,373,017,856      3,073,462,784      8,560,170,496      5,806        3,851        7,670        580,961 798,109 1,116,008 165,177 126,149 204,708 33.6% 26.5% 29.6%
connecticut 4,288,072,448      8,098,544,128      8,226,069,504      6,144        10,032      9,460        697,929 807,271 869,568 180,498 286,864 230,847 31.8% 31.4% 30.6%
delaware 582,245,824         891,791,488         1,198,751,488      4,235        5,129        5,549        137,485 173,874 216,046 117,084 157,535 153,474 32.3% 28.0% 29.2%
D.C. 987,615,872         1,225,863,040      1,412,150,912      10,995      12,655      13,983      89,828 96,866 100,993 236,762 316,488 296,733 37.4% 31.3% 32.9%
florida 8,611,905,536      11,832,546,304    19,615,412,224    3,941        3,427        4,418        2,185,388 3,452,472 4,439,483 136,515 137,655 146,958 26.9% 21.7% 23.3%
georgia 3,629,056,000      5,302,925,824      10,490,105,856    3,206        3,451        5,170        1,131,977 1,536,745 2,029,097 98,568 112,028 138,960 28.6% 25.4% 28.1%
hawaii 1,806,276,224      2,702,411,520      2,905,577,472      12,390      14,223      12,759      145,783 190,005 227,729 313,646 394,430 316,968 40.5% 33.5% 33.1%
idaho 428,736,544         652,517,888         1,548,928,000      4,018        2,582        4,557        106,701 252,670 339,913 129,274 89,276 130,260 31.8% 25.6% 28.7%
illinois 9,924,210,688      11,869,473,792    19,707,949,056    5,300        4,406        6,391        1,872,329 2,694,029 3,083,895 148,959 140,727 171,253 32.5% 25.0% 27.5%
indiana 3,012,318,464      3,314,499,584      6,128,819,200      3,103        2,285        3,672        970,666 1,450,766 1,669,036 101,982 83,422 113,003 29.1% 23.7% 26.0%
iowa 1,432,509,056      1,702,115,200      3,070,541,312      4,187        2,284        3,693        342,165 745,371 831,419 110,751 68,159 97,233 29.4% 23.0% 26.0%
kansas 1,765,733,888      1,938,567,168      2,932,505,088      4,750        3,021        4,079        371,740 641,760 718,852 113,504 78,970 100,258 30.6% 23.9% 27.3%
kentucky 1,278,161,536      1,891,647,360      3,814,249,728      3,107        1,969        3,390        411,350 960,473 1,125,263 101,580 75,539 100,380 27.9% 21.0% 25.6%
louisiana 2,216,166,400      2,039,128,320      3,485,700,096      3,611        2,064        3,099        613,664 987,958 1,124,960 123,998 86,733 104,837 28.3% 20.7% 23.9%
maine 539,102,592         1,367,156,992      1,591,701,248      3,145        4,170        4,292        171,395 327,846 370,893 102,243 132,530 120,413 29.0% 27.0% 28.2%
maryland 4,525,458,432      7,418,500,096      9,560,833,024      5,858        6,524        7,127        772,546 1,137,154 1,341,442 155,912 192,235 181,120 34.9% 28.9% 30.1%
massachusetts 5,115,107,840      11,840,002,048    14,027,061,248    4,658        8,901        9,322        1,098,037 1,330,122 1,504,750 126,902 252,197 239,309 36.7% 33.7% 31.2%
michigan 10,390,330,368    9,924,272,128      17,592,858,624    5,360        4,089        6,299        1,938,581 2,427,308 2,793,111 109,309 96,207 141,093 33.1% 25.5% 27.9%
minnesota 4,107,958,272      4,137,303,552      7,665,030,144      5,930        3,497        5,426        692,749 1,183,118 1,412,679 144,255 107,095 139,938 34.0% 27.9% 30.5%
mississippi 1,007,276,608      1,105,440,512      2,002,671,872      2,157        1,697        2,645        466,907 651,565 757,115 82,710 69,491 87,925 23.9% 19.9% 23.8%
missouri 2,607,953,152      3,644,891,392      6,112,291,840      3,471        2,703        3,963        751,437 1,348,536 1,542,237 105,572 90,693 110,746 29.4% 23.1% 26.3%
montana 428,192,928         490,939,264         1,037,627,648      3,879        2,384        4,190        110,392 205,895 247,622 118,764 81,022 119,956 30.2% 23.1% 26.2%
nebraska 763,762,240         853,186,688         1,674,232,704      3,721        2,131        3,727        205,278 400,382 449,178 108,070 72,160 100,306 30.9% 23.1% 27.1%
nevada 817,402,432         932,990,656         2,297,021,184      5,781        3,665        5,024        141,395 254,566 457,199 188,371 147,546 168,613 31.8% 23.2% 24.7%
N.H. 638,592,448         1,596,936,704      1,743,287,424      3,842        5,695        5,270        166,213 280,415 330,783 125,703 187,447 153,730 32.6% 29.3% 29.6%
new jersey 8,955,282,432      15,010,032,640    17,601,245,184    5,687        8,282        8,753        1,574,611 1,812,339 2,010,815 154,362 246,995 214,630 32.6% 28.3% 30.0%
new mexico 843,683,584         1,122,229,888      2,145,111,168      3,567        3,068        4,522        236,538 365,736 474,400 119,025 106,216 131,164 29.0% 24.2% 26.9%
new york 15,197,323,264    32,992,880,640    39,722,639,360    5,067        9,683        10,824      2,998,990 3,407,462 3,669,796 125,073 227,971 214,444 34.6% 30.1% 30.8%
N.C. 2,587,712,512      5,025,573,376      10,542,273,536    3,237        2,936        4,853        799,308 1,711,672 2,172,152 101,989 102,358 133,273 29.5% 24.2% 28.6%
north dakota 260,747,040         266,344,288         414,378,784         3,767        1,688        2,420        69,218 157,788 171,259 123,919 67,123 80,265 29.6% 20.8% 23.7%
ohio 8,087,154,176      7,822,331,392      13,320,946,688    3,812        2,836        4,336        2,121,384 2,757,772 3,072,384 120,203 97,637 125,233 30.0% 24.6% 27.4%
oklahoma 1,766,557,312      1,717,336,960      2,668,697,600      3,362        2,091        2,907        525,460 821,267 918,136 105,161 72,772 84,317 29.0% 22.8% 26.0%
oregon 2,869,642,496      2,504,379,392      6,482,011,648      6,001        3,599        7,565        478,187 695,772 856,858 152,463 104,173 177,739 34.2% 27.2% 31.2%
pennsylvania 8,800,496,640      10,449,649,664    13,818,100,736    3,415        3,290        4,057        2,577,100 3,176,255 3,406,045 105,430 115,942 120,697 29.3% 23.4% 25.7%
rhode island 803,631,232         1,482,526,720      1,485,555,840      4,056        6,594        6,060        198,140 224,829 245,128 123,122 202,311 160,513 30.7% 28.6% 29.2%
S.C. 1,481,468,416      2,477,453,568      4,762,169,344      3,107        2,820        4,299        476,795 878,396 1,107,619 98,249 96,554 123,803 29.4% 24.9% 27.3%
south dakota 226,558,576         239,957,360         484,884,800         2,869        1,402        2,450        78,964 171,122 197,902 108,525 61,841 87,845 25.5% 18.1% 21.3%
tennessee 2,262,095,872      2,840,229,632      5,612,573,696      2,975        2,252        3,595        760,328 1,260,974 1,561,394 101,570 90,677 116,947 29.9% 23.4% 26.6%
texas 9,122,002,944      8,877,802,496      15,597,929,472    3,700        2,403        3,307        2,465,540 3,694,082 4,716,914 116,826 96,644 107,786 27.8% 20.4% 22.8%
utah 1,217,788,160      1,136,289,280      3,210,896,384      5,028        3,106        6,401        242,219 365,781 501,605 153,176 105,104 174,779 32.3% 26.6% 29.7%
vermont 114,842,080         593,118,784         723,118,464         3,754        4,080        4,259        30,593 145,368 169,777 126,830 144,010 129,562 32.1% 27.5% 28.4%
virginia 5,300,419,584      7,820,744,192      10,895,771,648    4,564        5,148        5,928        1,161,331 1,519,273 1,837,926 131,179 159,395 157,349 31.6% 26.8% 31.7%
washington 4,037,749,760      4,768,554,496      9,521,277,952      4,813        4,074        6,494        838,846 1,170,590 1,466,081 157,329 156,948 207,334 30.0% 23.0% 25.3%
west virginia 874,336,896         899,306,240         1,402,487,936      3,147        1,763        2,533        277,790 510,041 553,619 106,439 71,315 85,444 28.6% 21.3% 24.3%
wisconsin 4,895,357,440      5,110,471,168      8,643,598,336      6,317        4,206        6,060        775,010 1,214,900 1,426,329 129,365 92,239 129,357 32.6% 27.4% 29.9%
wyoming 305,814,560         222,550,080         459,084,256         4,113        1,946        3,389        74,358 114,373 135,471 151,016 89,961 125,252 30.8% 20.4% 22.6%
Nation 197,878,141,392 284,002,854,736 420,069,163,200 4,840 4,818 6,024 40,885,208 58,951,786 69,730,677 137,536 148,106 158,764
value of aggregate tax benefits ($99) number of owners mean house value ($99) average marginal tax ratetax benefit per owner-occ unit ($99)
Appendix Table B: Data for Selected CBSAs
CBSA name
1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999
Akron, OH 638,726,656        516,888,928        932,638,016        4,012         3,006         4,827         159210 171939 193216 123,480     101,418     135,480     30.4% 24.9% 27.9%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 640,422,528        1,238,426,112     1,248,092,544     3,673         6,251         5,866         174374 198129 212761 97,292       146,335     122,295     33.3% 29.1% 29.5%
Albuquerque, NM 464,202,976        528,685,024        979,671,808        4,158         3,630         5,130         111640 145651 190951 136,033     122,163     145,352     30.8% 26.3% 28.6%
Anchorage, AK 294,608,640        222,468,304        386,975,904        8,616         4,157         5,291         34195 53517 73139 218,177     145,365     165,659     38.3% 25.4% 26.0%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 2,001,247,616     3,397,691,136     7,016,630,272     4,288         4,716         6,764         466664 720466 1037289 121,854     144,184     171,392     31.7% 28.0% 30.3%
Atlantic City, NJ 227,104,752        288,889,664        318,181,024        5,016         5,249         5,047         45272 55032 63040 145,769     168,175     143,500     29.9% 26.3% 27.2%
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 221,483,200        283,350,624        454,939,360        2,733         2,712         3,533         81039 104464 128785 89,463       93,675       105,276     28.1% 24.8% 26.8%
Austin-Round Rock, TX 433,828,544        517,870,752        1,510,661,632     4,275         3,100         5,496         101491 167072 274860 134,011     119,051     160,781     27.6% 21.6% 25.1%
Baltimore-Towson, MD 2,138,101,504     3,112,937,728     4,169,964,032     4,755         5,555         6,399         449670 560385 651626 133,862     166,357     165,544     33.0% 28.0% 29.3%
Baton Rouge, LA 397,446,304        335,150,976        635,060,992        3,963         2,309         3,569         100294 145173 177926 134,767     94,846       117,445     30.0% 22.2% 25.2%
Bellingham, WA 100,510,848        111,412,976        216,015,664        4,050         3,567         5,286         24816 31237 40863 149,040     146,820     187,997     28.0% 22.1% 24.3%
Bend, OR 18,944,644          86,332,608          264,858,176        4,869         4,165         8,034         3891 20728 32967 133,093     121,326     191,411     33.3% 27.8% 31.1%
Billings, MT 98,110,192          86,549,648          166,627,648        4,458         2,723         4,267         22008 31779 39052 136,578     89,560       117,921     31.2% 24.1% 26.7%
Boise City-Nampa, ID 255,588,224        235,741,696        617,279,104        4,210         2,894         5,046         60713 81459 122329 133,148     96,915       138,922     32.1% 26.9% 29.9%
Boston-Quincy, MA 1,444,536,960     3,393,614,336     4,288,292,608     4,772         9,753         10,941       302726 347955 391958 128,819     275,059     275,346     36.8% 34.1% 32.0%
Boulder, CO 243,525,776        280,866,944        880,046,848        6,889         5,199         11,855       35348 54027 74233 196,032     163,109     297,575     35.2% 28.7% 32.0%
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 1,923,640,576     3,205,777,664     3,909,148,416     10,189       15,405       17,418       188793 208103 224436 257,432     407,753     393,162     35.7% 33.3% 33.1%
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Tonawanda, NY 1,090,865,536     1,417,401,856     1,724,492,544     3,885         4,758         5,560         280786 297911 310169 95,849       103,569     101,591     33.0% 26.5% 27.9%
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 1,686,670,848     3,441,761,792     4,381,857,792     6,107         11,114       12,643       276194 309685 346591 156,010     302,768     307,466     39.6% 34.9% 33.1%
Camden, NJ 905,497,472        1,473,746,176     1,661,466,496     3,684         5,095         5,160         245816 289236 321989 114,437     161,389     141,217     31.1% 27.2% 28.6%
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 216,397,632        369,687,648        688,554,688        3,849         3,657         4,774         56220 101093 144240 145,256     149,217     159,251     27.2% 22.2% 23.5%
Cedar Rapids, IA 152,935,744        164,628,496        321,963,552        4,372         2,858         4,647         34981 57598 69290 113,523     83,039       118,592     31.1% 24.6% 27.5%
Champaign-Urbana, IL 131,526,608        120,526,896        175,654,320        4,328         2,771         3,599         30389 43501 48802 130,475     97,901       108,430     30.3% 23.6% 25.4%
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 298,552,576        392,901,024        814,481,280        3,492         3,538         5,887         85498 111039 138360 109,154     118,143     158,663     29.9% 26.0% 28.4%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 630,344,000        961,951,872        2,171,821,824     3,819         3,773         6,298         165057 254932 344824 111,778     122,980     160,711     31.3% 26.4% 30.5%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 7,231,012,352     8,616,651,776     14,298,169,344   5,916         5,763         8,185         1222261 1495156 1746863 163,745     179,722     214,446     33.4% 26.5% 28.8%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 1,349,861,376     1,492,849,408     2,720,939,264     4,086         3,350         5,192         330386 445659 524044 125,086     112,169     142,408     30.0% 25.3% 28.3%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 2,340,626,688     1,891,229,824     3,076,908,288     4,619         3,535         5,298         506780 535003 580806 137,384     115,657     145,946     31.7% 25.7% 28.1%
Columbia, MO 66,004,672          68,706,872          143,254,080        3,614         2,667         4,290         18265 25761 33395 116,401     91,526       122,095     29.3% 23.5% 26.9%
Columbia, SC 310,364,192        441,571,616        758,316,736        3,654         3,291         4,406         84942 134160 172118 111,649     108,000     124,057     31.1% 26.6% 28.3%
Columbus, GA-AL 125,229,640        135,079,872        219,418,608        2,418         2,487         3,528         51800 54308 62194 82,239       87,537       103,540     26.2% 23.1% 25.7%
Columbus, OH 907,619,136        1,094,443,392     2,082,875,776     3,741         3,389         5,193         242635 322933 401117 121,344     113,436     143,824     29.4% 25.8% 28.4%
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 1,787,127,680     2,052,730,112     3,614,394,368     4,704         3,773         4,926         379955 544026 733778 139,413     138,433     145,829     29.9% 23.0% 25.0%
Dayton, OH 650,570,688        641,685,248        929,741,120        3,571         3,024         4,092         182160 212196 227208 115,115     102,132     120,683     29.7% 25.4% 27.6%
Denver-Aurora, CO 2,126,247,552     1,727,210,368     4,661,587,968     6,653         4,235         8,257         319579 407822 564536 181,670     134,048     214,808     35.3% 27.5% 30.5%
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 2,523,734,528     1,749,090,432     2,907,995,904     4,606         3,508         5,681         547912 498536 511861 92,172       80,599       125,817     31.9% 24.1% 27.1%
Durham, NC 167,461,488        309,861,376        646,727,616        3,856         3,957         6,442         43430 78309 100396 115,163     128,616     163,509     30.4% 26.1% 29.9%
El Paso, TX 234,032,432        202,286,624        287,609,920        3,019         1,935         2,153         77511 104525 133596 107,332     88,590       82,208       24.9% 19.2% 21.1%
Erie, PA 214,140,800        152,758,544        240,796,192        3,169         2,192         3,267         67577 69705 73701 101,504     82,905       102,053     28.5% 22.4% 24.8%
Eugene-Springfield, OR 352,309,856        230,356,576        548,142,784        5,948         3,418         6,750         59234 67387 81208 154,441     100,775     163,778     33.3% 26.6% 30.5%
Fairbanks, AK 48,781,984          41,802,852          67,040,700          5,564         3,195         4,172         8767 13083 16070 157,684     122,467     138,943     34.5% 24.2% 25.1%
Flagstaff, AZ 27,159,490          63,852,540          137,561,136        4,954         3,539         5,549         5482 18042 24790 155,558     119,531     164,975     32.6% 24.7% 26.3%
Flint, MI 555,334,336        381,794,816        615,705,408        4,852         3,361         4,950         114454 113585 124382 96,477       76,577       110,748     33.3% 25.0% 27.1%
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 1,646,826,880     1,605,702,016     2,339,358,976     5,853         4,466         5,146         281351 359532 454625 186,762     172,201     166,958     30.0% 23.4% 24.3%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 714,726,016        895,811,776        1,444,907,520     3,322         2,906         3,629         215119 308241 398192 112,082     112,403     116,109     28.0% 22.5% 24.0%
Fresno, CA 486,070,144        468,251,712        651,644,352        5,177         3,906         4,562         93896 119869 142856 160,012     132,301     130,421     32.3% 26.3% 27.4%
Grand Junction, CO 84,098,384          59,602,872          151,216,544        4,694         2,533         4,540         17917 23534 33306 146,049     94,419       142,770     31.3% 23.7% 26.8%
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 589,228,928        658,072,000        1,137,655,680     4,486         3,938         5,716         131340 167128 199044 98,972       96,166       131,514     31.6% 26.0% 28.2%
Greensboro-High Point, NC 340,587,552        452,484,608        814,777,856        3,430         3,210         4,745         99286 140951 171721 105,193     109,639     129,803     30.3% 25.3% 29.1%
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 366,251,072        386,465,376        573,905,792        3,300         3,084         4,069         110999 125306 141039 108,277     111,617     125,401     30.0% 24.8% 26.4%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 1,158,310,656     2,346,470,912     2,000,050,816     5,021         8,571         6,763         230680 273757 295713 159,024     252,005     174,273     31.6% 31.4% 30.3%
Honolulu, HI 1,502,906,240     2,205,694,720     2,204,443,648     13,491       16,218       14,115       111399 136004 156179 335,396     446,772     346,203     41.4% 34.3% 33.7%
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX 3,217,568,256     2,229,041,408     4,054,737,408     5,122         2,922         4,019         628231 762905 1008875 146,784     109,944     123,350     31.3% 22.0% 23.9%
Huntsville, AL 148,019,184        234,739,440        393,487,488        2,935         3,156         4,104         50432 74386 95890 101,690     110,519     122,707     28.7% 25.3% 26.8%
Indianapolis, IN 873,032,064        949,692,672        1,911,556,224     3,457         2,984         4,751         252532 318234 402315 109,099     103,797     138,588     30.0% 25.2% 27.3%
Iowa City, IA 62,661,960          88,865,784          176,962,272        5,519         3,651         5,698         11354 24342 31055 144,804     105,105     143,365     31.6% 25.4% 27.6%
Ithaca, NY 66,261,812          114,455,608        124,161,200        4,062         6,211         6,340         16312 18427 19583 108,107     143,203     118,815     32.3% 28.2% 28.4%
Jonesboro, AR 23,401,900          44,457,928          79,336,656          3,180         1,908         2,901         7358 23306 27351 100,033     69,860       86,894       26.6% 20.4% 25.5%
Kansas City, MO-KS 1,351,621,504     1,420,376,064     2,399,717,888     4,240         3,428         4,902         318750 414357 489569 113,505     99,453       124,990     30.9% 25.2% 28.3%
Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA 143,552,320        76,011,232          175,173,440        4,656         2,240         3,800         30829 33940 46094 148,891     94,512       132,466     31.7% 21.6% 24.2%
Knoxville, TN 338,131,616        343,717,664        679,502,080        2,965         2,402         3,825         114060 143120 177630 102,427     95,948       123,920     29.8% 24.1% 26.8%
Lafayette, IN 80,248,152          86,830,472          158,273,760        3,781         2,543         3,985         21223 34141 39721 125,626     93,652       123,865     29.7% 24.1% 26.2%
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI 881,901,568        1,269,607,936     2,215,093,760     8,637         7,874         10,700       102105 161245 207026 197,791     220,613     249,906     36.6% 28.2% 30.7%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 481,587,744        521,283,520        1,474,359,168     5,221         3,518         4,869         92232 148158 302807 175,772     143,027     163,791     31.0% 23.1% 24.8%
Lawrence, KS 38,067,052          59,406,500          109,807,448        4,391         3,755         5,504         8669 15821 19951 114,497     100,642     139,411     28.3% 24.2% 28.1%
Lewiston-Auburn, ME 57,581,660          92,324,232          92,302,400          2,655         3,707         3,466         21687 24906 26628 92,088       122,663     99,836       27.6% 26.9% 27.7%
Lexington-Fayette, KY 247,835,472        242,404,256        466,688,000        3,920         3,128         4,758         63228 77504 98076 128,039     112,415     133,161     29.2% 24.0% 27.9%
Lincoln, NE 165,446,768        149,776,992        298,532,896        4,317         2,779         4,651         38323 53892 64193 122,495     90,875       123,599     31.6% 24.9% 28.4%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 12,335,770,624   19,375,642,624   18,130,198,528   9,585         13,457       12,096       1287008 1439801 1498881 254,380     386,087     295,509     37.1% 32.1% 32.0%
Louisville, KY-IN 623,438,208        680,264,640        1,443,264,256     3,027         2,468         4,492         205993 275630 321312 97,123       89,075       126,171     28.2% 23.2% 27.4%
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Appendix Table B: Data for Selected CBSAs
CBSA name
1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999
tax benefit per owner occ unit ($99)value of aggregate tax benefits ($99) marginal tax ratesnumber of owners mean house value ($99)
Macon, GA 106,113,760        124,471,864        197,234,224        2,667         2,591         3,548         39792 48041 55594 86,153       89,470       105,459     27.5% 23.7% 26.2%
Madison, WI 373,065,632        495,135,296        942,124,736        7,008         5,150         7,733         53238 96139 121835 148,707     110,895     162,775     33.4% 29.1% 31.2%
Manchester-Nashua, NH 252,867,904        494,829,472        519,464,800        4,212         6,235         5,537         60031 79363 93820 132,885     197,864     155,980     33.6% 30.1% 30.3%
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX 84,481,144          84,757,600          176,520,048        1,687         1,166         1,541         50078 72715 114570 72,628       59,351       65,744       20.9% 15.3% 18.9%
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 572,445,952        663,853,760        1,195,546,112     3,055         2,763         4,040         187405 240235 295908 100,904     103,283     122,037     29.7% 24.5% 27.5%
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 1,600,257,280     1,605,941,248     2,571,840,768     5,492         4,271         5,737         291367 375990 448280 180,534     28.3% 21.7% 23.3%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 2,199,099,648     1,747,426,944     2,720,813,568     7,738         5,467         7,581         284193 319630 358877 149,936     115,181     154,504     34.4% 28.5% 30.3%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 3,359,491,072     3,105,091,072     5,678,496,768     6,812         4,701         6,897         493185 660569 823283 160,214     135,993     169,146     36.0% 30.3% 32.1%
Montgomery, AL 182,564,864        181,515,440        324,919,904        3,005         2,451         3,584         60763 74048 90661 103,484     92,742       112,540     27.8% 23.1% 25.7%
Napa, CA 185,243,440        266,457,696        422,983,296        7,754         9,994         14,307       23890 26662 29564 217,283     296,582     341,203     36.6% 31.9% 33.8%
Naples-Marco Island, FL 123,653,272        311,607,616        804,793,664        6,538         7,193         10,341       18912 43319 77829 197,018     254,473     287,863     28.8% 24.3% 26.1%
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 2,659,852,800     4,215,533,312     5,068,328,448     6,923         9,929         10,870       384233 424570 466273 175,800     287,460     254,550     33.4% 28.7% 30.6%
New Haven-Milford, CT 756,322,624        1,546,504,576     1,366,751,872     4,559         8,073         6,789         165903 191558 201320 150,936     244,286     177,198     29.6% 30.2% 29.2%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 955,555,328        757,202,432        1,262,510,592     4,321         2,801         4,118         221142 270328 306586 144,274     111,223     131,447     29.1% 22.6% 25.2%
New York-Wayne-White Plains, NY-NJ 7,755,856,896     17,816,422,400   22,499,680,256   6,341         12,827       14,776       1223091 1388925 1522705 165,309     342,882     327,423     34.1% 30.8% 31.7%
Norwich-New London, CT 199,853,296        439,776,064        429,275,584        3,858         7,291         6,451         51806 60315 66548 137,116     229,243     171,501     28.8% 29.5% 29.0%
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 3,027,167,744     5,568,395,776     7,949,591,552     8,427         12,156       15,151       359203 458087 524702 228,772     340,522     346,390     37.6% 32.7% 34.4%
Ocala, FL 65,046,552          117,274,488        210,059,008        2,023         1,984         2,466         32149 59112 85171 91,699       96,685       100,479     21.9% 19.4% 21.1%
Oklahoma City, OK 757,557,952        601,781,632        957,260,928        3,824         2,498         3,418         198083 240886 280030 113,343     83,771       95,609       30.3% 24.4% 27.1%
Olympia, WA 100,586,032        120,403,280        270,171,008        3,765         2,993         4,970         26713 40226 54364 142,915     121,344     168,830     28.6% 22.6% 24.8%
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 468,226,624        465,733,024        940,805,696        3,604         2,768         4,780         129908 168235 196838 102,600     86,825       120,099     31.0% 25.0% 28.6%
Orlando, FL 565,440,832        967,848,448        1,668,616,320     3,255         3,240         4,025         173703 298736 414548 121,413     131,411     136,957     26.4% 22.6% 23.8%
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 161,374,368        150,973,088        236,083,616        5,558         4,262         5,681         29037 35423 41558 114,657     92,898       121,612     31.7% 27.9% 30.2%
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 927,708,288        1,920,400,768     2,117,084,288     8,553         13,501       12,895       108469 142242 164185 244,050     379,015     297,286     38.6% 34.0% 34.1%
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 244,048,880        349,099,968        486,164,704        3,764         3,124         3,288         64832 111742 147878 133,669     128,269     120,474     28.0% 22.6% 23.1%
Peoria, IL 340,588,960        214,362,224        371,938,432        4,384         2,291         3,565         77684 93555 104331 125,203     77,900       105,416     31.7% 23.2% 25.9%
Philadelphia, PA 3,228,380,672     4,720,415,744     5,614,452,736     3,742         4,979         5,627         862778 947977 997749 110,273     162,830     153,021     30.2% 25.2% 27.0%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 1,897,470,592     2,175,566,336     4,587,456,512     5,171         4,033         5,653         366932 539474 811467 151,625     132,229     160,945     32.9% 26.7% 27.8%
Pittsburgh, PA 2,370,635,520     1,693,993,728     2,559,060,736     3,809         2,475         3,598         622376 684553 711338 109,745     87,896       105,831     29.9% 22.3% 25.2%
Portland-South Portland, ME 311,336,096        680,303,936        802,344,640        3,595         5,969         5,882         86610 113967 136405 113,144     178,725     154,830     29.8% 29.6% 30.1%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1,915,478,144     1,454,741,760     4,102,248,704     6,423         3,986         8,745         298227 364981 469092 162,216     115,700     205,031     34.7% 27.7% 31.5%
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 481,094,112        1,227,028,224     1,362,951,680     4,632         9,416         9,363         103852 130318 145570 115,355     209,302     167,594     34.9% 31.5% 31.1%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 1,118,298,240     2,216,024,576     2,237,987,840     3,801         6,602         6,025         294217 335660 371451 115,752     200,987     163,042     31.6% 29.8% 29.3%
Provo-Orem, UT 119,019,400        136,340,208        449,609,312        4,698         3,000         6,542         25332 45445 68727 153,190     106,098     185,641     30.6% 26.2% 29.7%
Raleigh-Cary, NC 273,847,648        568,685,760        1,464,367,872     4,163         4,267         7,055         65779 133280 207558 123,745     135,440     176,139     32.3% 27.1% 31.5%
Rapid City, SD 52,500,996          43,098,092          85,072,720          3,307         1,837         2,940         15874 23455 28937 123,886     79,631       105,847     26.6% 19.9% 22.4%
Redding, CA 124,933,808        141,344,464        195,947,280        4,560         3,914         4,671         27397 36112 41949 155,614     139,517     142,253     31.3% 26.4% 27.3%
Reno-Sparks, NV 291,332,256        254,740,128        510,701,760        7,002         4,536         6,426         41607 56155 79472 214,022     175,032     202,884     33.3% 23.8% 25.3%
Richmond, VA 669,487,680        908,106,944        1,464,138,752     3,793         3,794         5,007         176500 239381 292409 115,089     122,637     137,469     30.9% 26.6% 30.8%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 1,846,830,848     3,668,636,672     4,094,103,296     5,265         6,491         5,938         350795 565185 689482 168,143     204,026     162,849     33.3% 29.5% 29.4%
Roanoke, VA 214,533,808        226,308,672        365,496,800        3,287         3,058         4,328         65270 74008 84449 103,743     104,160     126,589     29.2% 24.9% 25.9%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 1,423,387,776     2,240,527,104     3,018,712,832     5,736         6,823         7,404         248142 328401 407689 176,334     211,623     192,757     34.6% 30.0% 31.1%
St. Louis, MO-IL 1,820,621,184     2,325,556,992     3,613,991,424     3,732         3,425         4,769         487892 678994 757785 111,153     111,186     127,647     30.2% 24.9% 27.5%
Salt Lake City, UT 713,197,184        573,228,224        1,654,642,688     5,484         3,446         7,473         130047 166327 221403 160,980     113,302     195,723     33.2% 27.2% 30.7%
San Antonio, TX 615,769,728        662,697,600        1,136,645,376     2,909         2,246         2,931         211699 295080 387744 98,278       93,760       99,789       25.2% 20.1% 22.5%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 3,071,007,488     4,980,189,184     6,419,328,000     8,758         10,435       11,641       350663 477281 551431 249,665     306,009     286,299     36.4% 31.5% 32.5%
Sandusky, OH 70,773,448          58,789,320          100,586,704        3,815         2,849         4,401         18553 20633 22854 122,551     98,353       130,743     31.0% 25.7% 27.8%
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 3,709,906,944     5,785,719,296     8,834,676,736     13,126       18,697       26,385       282648 309446 334833 332,138     518,772     583,460     41.3% 34.6% 37.2%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 2,758,220,288     5,184,223,744     8,606,179,328     11,320       16,494       24,629       243657 314308 349429 290,104     449,598     538,704     41.6% 34.7% 37.5%
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 4,166,436,096     6,879,275,520     8,379,301,376     10,719       13,847       14,593       388700 496824 574181 280,805     384,555     326,706     41.2% 34.0% 34.3%
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 558,587,776        994,041,536        1,283,205,888     10,731       13,992       16,759       52053 71043 76569 288,900     402,659     398,362     37.9% 32.6% 33.5%
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 333,710,304        677,507,904        995,440,064        8,598         13,536       18,210       38812 50052 54665 261,270     392,714     432,492     36.2% 33.0% 35.1%
Santa Fe, NM 55,636,284          150,503,536        345,525,184        5,339         5,877         9,604         10421 25608 35977 168,263     189,389     251,715     30.7% 27.6% 30.9%
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 436,005,728        605,854,720        1,071,165,696     3,983         3,783         5,317         109453 160172 201474 144,247     150,912     171,466     26.9% 22.4% 23.9%
Savannah, GA 151,784,432        185,250,416        355,236,000        3,235         3,157         4,970         46919 58678 71471 98,719       104,369     134,631     28.5% 25.1% 27.6%
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 2,229,990,912     2,890,294,784     5,330,780,160     6,068         6,088         9,240         367495 474735 576927 184,888     220,745     276,008     32.6% 25.4% 27.5%
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 198,112,160        181,614,032        274,112,640        3,195         2,075         2,873         62013 87508 95407 107,286     85,519       94,969       27.4% 20.8% 23.7%
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 89,235,160          66,895,184          125,322,664        3,277         1,971         3,373         27230 33941 37156 91,953       61,679       91,749       27.9% 21.7% 25.9%
Spokane, WA 285,376,064        194,817,424        401,747,264        3,339         2,159         3,749         85460 90221 107166 126,012     93,394       134,843     27.0% 20.5% 23.1%
Springfield, MA 388,719,040        908,740,160        770,020,096        3,241         5,994         4,678         119955 151613 164620 95,752       179,553     137,132     34.5% 32.3% 28.7%
Suffolk County-Nassau County, NY 4,128,623,360     9,964,110,848     11,485,210,624   6,469         14,493       15,655       638170 687506 733627 144,078     303,670     271,158     40.4% 33.5% 34.0%
Syracuse, NY 530,014,112        832,231,296        861,968,960        3,762         5,155         5,102         140902 161439 168948 94,019       112,818     97,032       33.3% 27.9% 28.0%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 1,237,367,680     1,688,922,880     2,503,383,040     2,827         2,804         3,510         437714 602266 713279 110,606     119,167     124,169     25.2% 21.4% 23.0%
Toledo, OH 587,011,584        472,215,840        747,959,936        3,786         2,852         4,224         155038 165601 177066 116,684     95,903       121,175     30.0% 24.7% 27.0%
Topeka, KS 205,075,568        167,908,912        228,201,648        4,496         2,926         3,593         45608 57376 63505 109,656     77,186       90,824       30.4% 24.7% 27.4%
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 348,361,920        594,385,728        703,982,080        5,113         7,638         8,348         68136 77818 84325 136,347     222,056     198,387     32.3% 28.0% 29.7%
Tucson, AZ 631,105,600        561,815,424        992,154,624        4,964         3,525         4,645         127132 159362 213613 148,231     120,121     140,680     31.5% 25.3% 26.2%
Tulsa, OK 576,693,888        510,295,296        828,991,872        3,789         2,595         3,647         152221 196646 227323 117,616     87,982       101,605     30.4% 24.6% 27.4%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 4,013,167,872     6,601,027,584     8,239,034,880     8,349         9,371         9,463         480683 704426 870699 203,658     260,940     225,074     38.5% 31.5% 32.9%
Wichita, KS 460,482,208        439,964,768        595,440,128        4,696         3,410         3,967         98055 129026 150090 109,382     85,665       96,959       30.8% 25.1% 27.6%
Appendix Table B: Data for Selected CBSAs
CBSA name
1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999
tax benefit per owner occ unit ($99)value of aggregate tax benefits ($99) marginal tax ratesnumber of owners mean house value ($99)
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 505,963,968        796,335,040        987,129,664        4,240         5,389         5,686         119345 147772 173622 118,327     165,297     154,280     32.8% 28.6% 29.8%
Winston-Salem, NC 248,565,392        322,453,408        571,343,360        3,532         3,281         4,811         70374 98271 118770 106,231     110,821     132,112     30.2% 25.4% 28.9%
York-Hanover, PA 279,696,768        296,279,584        439,873,792        3,358         3,097         3,899         83291 95670 112816 113,860     115,345     124,982     29.5% 24.8% 26.4%
